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PREFACE
This working paper presents a preliminary synthesis of ideas
concerning the function which product standards serve in markets.
The ideas are presented in summary, unreferenced fashion and are a
distillation of ongoing research. They are presented now in order
to facilitate discussion concerning them while work continues.
The framework being developed here is part of the Analysis and
Evaluation of Performance Criteria Task of the project entitled
"Planning and Analysis for Development of Photovoltaic Energy Conversion
Systems" supported at the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory by the U.S.
Department of Energy. The project is under the overall leadership of
Richard D. Tabors.
Drew J. Bottaro is the principal investigator on the task.
The analysis presented below was supported by research (as yet
unpublished) by Andrea L. Mobilia and James P. Leape; Richard D.
Tabors advised on the organization of the working paper.
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the role of product standards in a
commercialization program. The usefulness of standards is explained as
arising from the existence of transaction costs and other market failures
in the operation of markets, and the effects of standards upon market
operation are broadly discussed. The role of standards in a
commercialization program is then explored and is seen as justified by
the existence of market failures and the lack of suitable options other
than standards available for remedying certain particulars of the
situation. A description of the voluntary standards system follows to
show how its use in a commercialization program may modify the
governmental role.
PRODUCT STANDARDS AND COMMERCIALIZATION
The purpose of standards activities in a commercialization program
is to produce those socially beneficial effects, produced better by
standards than by other alternatives, which would not occur absent those
standards activities. The need for standards arises from practical
problems in the operation of markets.
In a theoretically ideal market there would be no need for
standards. Transactions between buyers and sellers in the market place
would not incur any costs, i.e., they would not take time or expense and
the information necessary for completing the transaction would be free.
But transactions do have associated costs in real market situations, and
methods for simplifying market transactions are therefore socially
advantageous.
Product standards provide one method for lubricating the market
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place and mitigating the costs of transactions.* They benefit the
market in one of two principal ways; they provide information to those in
the marketplace, whether they be buyers, sellers, or potential investors,
or they represent agreements among those in the marketplace. Examples of
agreements include agreements as to sizes, terminology, product grades,
and minimum quality. Most standards contain elements of both benefits.
For example, standards on lumber sizes (such as the dimensions of a 2X4)
provide not only information on the product's size and quality but also
represent an agreement as to what sizes will be produced (and hence
bought and sold in the marketplace). Standards provide these twin
benefits of information and agreement in a manner applicable to whole
classes of transactions, thus saving the need in many circumstances for
individual, i.e., contractual, agreement and information exchange between
a particular buyer and a particular seller on many details of the
transaction at hand. By substituting a single rule of general
application for transaction-specific rules which, while individually less
costly than a generally applicable rule, are more costly in the
aggregate, standards produce their benefits to society.
Standards can have both positive and negative effects upon the
industry to which they apply. These effects can be grouped into three
* Other ways, such as increased R&D, regulation and taxes and tax
credits, to name a few, may be more or less effective than standards in
achieving particular results. Hence these other options must be
considered when designing a commercialization strategy; those effects for
which standards are best suited to remedy should be the aim of
standardization efforts in a commercialization context.
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basic categories: effects which affect the product's cost, effects which
expand the demand for the product, and effects upon the competitive
nature of the standardized product's industry. Each group of effects
will be discussed below.
First, standards can affect the cost of the industry's product.
This can occur in one of several ways. "Unnecessary" grades or product
lines can be eliminated, thus permitting greater economies of scale than
would occur absent the standards. Interchangeability of parts can reduce
the costs of assembling the product, can reduce the levels of inventory
required to transact business, and can also reduce repair and maintenance
costs arising during the product's use. Interchangeability may also
result in increased technological competition, thus reducing unit costs.
The standards created may also be a means of transmitting information
regarding the technology. Some negative effects upon cost may also
result. Emphasis of certain product attributes by the product standards
might cause other product attributes to be overlooked or given inadequate
attention. New designs may be judged by old standards, thus making
radical design departures difficult.
Second, standards can, if properly designed, expand the demand for
the industry's product. They can make the industry's product
interchangeable with existing technology, thereby allowing the new
product to be substituted more readily for existing technology. For
example, standardizing the screw threads for a new design of fluorescent
bulb so that it fits incandescent bulb sockets will clearly make the new
bulb more desirable. Product standardization may provide information
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concerning the product and may facilitate comparison shopping with
substitutes for the product; an increased ability to compare will help a
new technology gain entry to established markets. The existence of a
standardized product also tends to assure purchasers of a secure supply
of the product because the purchaser is not forced to rely upon a single
producer; this consideration is particularly important for intermediate
goods which are purchased as inputs to the purchaser's manufacturing
process. Consumer confidence in the product may rise with the existence
of minimum 'quality standards for the product, thus increasing the
product's demand. If improperly designed, however, standards can work
against any of these effects and thus actually reduce demand for the
product.
Third, standards can have effects upon the competitive nature of the
standardized product's industry. While in some cases standards only
reinforce the existing industrial behavior by making a competitive
industry more competitive and an uncompetitive industry less so, they can
also counter existing circumstances; they do not necessarily mirror
market conditions. Product standardization can reduce product
differentiation, thus making a market more competitive. Similarly, it
might reduce the effects of brand names, thus lowering barriers to entry
into the industry. If product standardization results in increased
interchangeability of products, markets for the product will widen as
sellers' capture of particular submarkets weakens; further lowering of
barriers to entry may result. The effects are not all positive; the
economies of scale derived from variety reduction and other effects of
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standards may result in raised barriers to entry. Furthermore,
standardization by its very nature facilitates coordination among the
suppliers of a product; such coordination might result in monopolistic
activities such as price-fixing and could result in legal (anti-trust)
problems.
Hence standards have a role in most markets; economic incentives
exist to try to bring about the effects discussed above, whether those
effects be socially desirable or not. Hence they will have a role in a
commercialization program. In the commercialization context a standards
effort should be aimed to encourage standard which 1) are desirable
socially but which 2) would not be forthcoming in a timely fashion or
with the most socially desirable content if left solely to the private
sector.* Stated differently, a governmental standards effort should
select those standardization efforts whose social benefits exceed their
social costs and which would not occur without governmental intervention
because private costs exceeded private benefits or because associated
transaction costs prevented their occurrence.
The above may be summarized as follows: The role of standardization
activities in a commercialization effort is defined by the market
failures present in the new technology's industry and the suitability of
standards versus other options for attacking those market failures. Once
* For further discussion of the aims of commercialization programs, see
M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Policy Study Group, "Government Support for the
Commercialization of New Energy Technologies", MIT-EL 76-009, November 1976.
6
that role is defined and (hence) the effects which the standardization
activity aims to alleviate are made explicit, the types of standards to
be developed may be selected by the types of effects they are likely to
produce.
The specific strategy by which the selected types of standards are
to become effective is somewhat constrained, however. Because the only
standards-setting "authority" DOE has extends only to requirements for
procurements and grants, DOE must use the voluntary standards system to
produce the effects it desires. The operation of that system, the
incentives for its members' behavior, and the way the system is
structured must therefore enter into DOE plans for involvement in the
system. A short though simplified explanation of the system will
indicate the complications which must enter into DOE planning.
Ordinarily standards are produced by an organization which
coordinates the activities of those wishing to create standards. Upon
"consensus" of those participating, the standards become official in the
sense that the standards organization adopts them as having resulted from
compliance with the organization's procedures. Consensus generally does
not mean unanimity but a large majority with no "substantial" objections.
Use of the standards is voluntary; failure to use the standards
results in only the sanctions of the marketplace. To the extent that
being out of step with those in the industry using the standards is
costly, incentives for using the standards exist.
While internal (producer only) use of standards is often in itself
beneficial, frequently producers desire to communicate compliance with a
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standard or standards to potential buyers. The producer may simply
assert compliance with the standards; however, in order to add
credibility to the producer's claim the tests are performed by testing
laboratories and the results certified by an umbrella organization such
as a trade association. While the standards organization, the certifying
organization, and the testing laboratory are most credible when the three
functions are separate, they need not be so; one organization could
perform all three functions. How the functions are divided up depends
upon the value of the added credibility.
Thus planning commercialization efforts in the standards area must
identify circumstances in which socially desirable standards activities
would not arise from the private sector, identify which situations are
most suitable for a solution of standards, and interact constructively
with the voluntary standards system.
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